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A SEPARATION OF POWERS ANALYSIS 
OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS’ 
ADEQUATE AVAILABLE FORUM 
JASON S. PALMER† 
The general doctrine of our Constitution then is, that the 
executive power of the nation is vested in the president, 
subject only to the exceptions and qualifications, which are 
expressed in the instrument.1 
– Alexander Hamilton 
INTRODUCTION 
“Boehner snubs [White House], invites Netanyahu to address 
Congress.”2  These words, or words remarkably similar, headlined 
newspapers all around the United States on January 21, 2015.3  
Without consulting President Obama, House Speaker John 
Boehner invited Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu to 
address a joint session of Congress in opposition to the White 
House’s overtures to Iran with respect to its nuclear program.4  
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1 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, PACIFICUS NO. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 7 THE 
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 76, 81 (John C. Hamilton ed., 1851). 
2 Susan Davis, Boehner Snubs WH, Invites Netanyahu To Address Congress, 
USA TODAY (Jan. 22, 2015, 7:09 AM), http://usat.ly/1JeZq5d [https://perma.cc/XY92-
2TZ5].  
3 See, e.g., id. 
4 Id. Speaker Boehner, in a statement regarding the invitation, stated, “I am 
asking the prime minister to address Congress on the grave threats radical Islam 
and Iran pose to our security and way of life.” See Jake Miller, Boehner Invites 
Benjamin Netanyahu To Address Congress, CBS NEWS (Jan. 21, 2015, 4:40 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/john-boehner-invites-israeli-prime-minister-benjamin-
netanyahu-to-address-congress/ [https://perma.cc/BD57-W8LJ].  
158 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:157  
Speaker Boehner extended the invitation in apparent response to 
President Obama’s State of the Union Address, in which he in-
formed Congress that any further economic sanctions bill against 
Iran at that time would be detrimental to ongoing diplomatic 
negotiations and would be vetoed.5  Prime Minister Netanyahu 
accepted the offer and addressed a joint session of Congress.6  
Questions were immediately raised about the unprecedented 
breach of diplomatic protocol, as invitations to foreign leaders to 
address Congress are usually made in consultation with the White 
House and State Department.7  Some went so far as to question 
whether the invitation was unconstitutional.8  According to Article 
II, Section 3, of the United States Constitution, the President of 
the United States “shall receive Ambassadors and other public 
Ministers” from foreign governments.9  Critics of the invitation 
argued that Prime Minister Netanyahu, appearing as the official 
representative of his country, should be classified as a “public 
minister.”  According to Stanford University Professor Jack Rakove, 
the Founding Fathers empowered the President with this role for 
a specific reason—to facilitate negotiations with foreign powers 
regarding complex issues on behalf of the United States.10  In this 
regard, while Congress is tasked with declaring war,11 “the 
[P]resident is charged with making peace—and ‘peace [was] at-
tended with intricate and secret negotiations.’ ”12  This decision, 
enshrined in the Constitution, demonstrated the Founding 
Fathers’ desire to have the President in charge of “delicate” 
negotiations with foreign governments that required discretion.13  
While Boehner’s invitation to Netanyahu did not precipitate a 
constitutional crisis, it did raise the question of which branch of 
 
5 Miller, supra note 4. 
6 The Complete Transcript of Netanyahu’s Address to Congress, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 3, 2015, 12:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/ 
03/03/full-text-netanyahus-address-to-congress/ [https://perma.cc/Q36F-5ZAN].  
7 See Davis, supra note 2. 
8 See, e.g., Elizabeth Cobbs, Why Boehner’s Invite to Netanyahu Is Unconsti-
tutional, REUTERS (Mar. 2, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/03/01/ 
netanyahu-invite-is-a-symptom-of-boehners-grudge-match-against-the-u-s-constitution/ 
[https://perma.cc/LK4B-B2AV]. 
9 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  
10 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 267 (1996) (“Familiar as the [F]ramers were with these epi-
sodes, they could readily appreciate the diplomatic and political advantages of 
allowing the [P]resident a significant initiative in the conduct of foreign relations.”). 
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
12 Cobbs, supra note 8 (alteration in original). 
13 Id. 
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government, the executive or the legislative, should control this 
important aspect of foreign policy.14 
Discussions of the separation of powers principle often focus 
on the relationship and power struggle between the executive and 
legislative branches of the United States federal government as 
evidenced by the dichotomous power struggle over the Netanyahu 
invitation.  Some separation of powers arguments target over-
reaching by a zealous Executive whom the legislative branch 
wants to reign in and control.  Or they involve a strong and domi-
nant Congress that overrides and ignores a perceived weaker 
President.  At other times, separation of powers discussions may 
focus on how the judiciary and the Executive interact and decide 
issues that touch upon foreign policy or political questions.  
Harold Koh, the former Legal Adviser at the United States 
Department of State, in discussing separation of powers doctrine, 
stated that “the Founding Fathers framed the constitutional 
provisions on foreign affairs with two goals in mind—to fashion a 
stronger national government while holding each branch of that 
government accountable to the others through a strong system of 
checks and balances.”15 
In evaluating the role of separation of powers, the Executive 
is often perceived as having significant independent power in the 
area of foreign relations, while courts have a limited role in 
matters that implicate foreign affairs.  But from where exactly 
does the Executive’s foreign affairs power derive?  Some argue 
this foreign affairs power arises from the inherent concepts of 
nationality and sovereignty under international law.  Others 
argue that the Executive’s foreign affairs powers derive either 
explicitly or implicitly from Article II of the United States 
Constitution.  While the Constitution is actually silent on the 
exact role of the Executive with regard to the international 
arena, Koh opined that when evaluating the role of the Executive 
 
14 Likewise, in March 2015, Senator Tom Cotton and forty-six other Republican 
members of Congress wrote an “open letter” to the leaders of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran with the intent of advising them regarding United States constitutional law 
relating to international agreement making. Press Release, Tom Cotton, Senator, State 
of Arkansas, Cotton and 46 Fellow Senators to Send Open Letter to the Leaders of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.cotton.senate.gov/?p= 
press_release&id=120 [https://perma.cc/FM96-FHGX]. This letter was an undisguised 
attempt to undercut the Obama administration’s ability to negotiate regarding 
nuclear disarmament with the Iranian government, and thus was an unprecedented 
attack on the Executive’s power to negotiate with foreign nations. 
15 HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING 
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 74–75 (1990).  
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with respect to foreign affairs, one should look to a “normative 
vision of the foreign policy-making process” that “lurks within 
our constitutional system.”16  While the Executive should not 
have unbridled control over foreign affairs, great deference and 
respect should be accorded to the political aspects surrounding 
foreign policy determinations.  While no foreign affairs clause 
exists in the Constitution, executive powers derived from the 
Constitution include “the important foreign affairs powers 
encompassing a nation’s relationship with those outside it—
principally, diplomatic and military powers.”17  Further, according 
to Professor Michael Ramsey, a textual basis in the Constitution 
exists for the Executive’s foreign affairs powers.18  Article II, 
Section 1, of the Constitution states that the President has the 
“executive Power” of the United States.19  While this clause might 
not seem to discuss foreign affairs, Professor Ramsey states, “it 
was associated with foreign affairs in eighteenth-century uses of 
the term.”20  With this understanding of Article II, Section 1, in 
mind, limits were designed regarding the President’s “executive 
Power.”  Checks and balances were developed to moderate these 
powers.  Even so, despite the checks and balances achieved through 
separation of powers as understood from the Constitution, courts 
are not “in charge of foreign affairs” and should not “undertake 
foreign affairs policymaking.”21  These principles should have im-
portant implications for how the courts are addressing forum non 
conveniens analyses, especially with respect to adequate alter-
native forum. 
Forum non conveniens, a common law doctrine, was initially 
developed to protect foreign defendants from being forced to 
litigate claims in forums that were unreasonable, despite the 
preference to allow plaintiffs the right to choose where and how 
to litigate their claims.  The Supreme Court of the United States 
gave weight to the doctrine of forum non conveniens in Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Gilbert,22 which it further clarified in Piper Aircraft Co. 
v. Reyno.23  The forum non conveniens doctrine, as established by 
the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp., developed as a preventive 
 
16 Id. at 68. 
17 MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 5 (2007). 
18 Id. at 52. 
19 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.  
20 RAMSEY, supra note 17, at 52 (emphasis omitted). 
21 Id. at 7. 
22 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947). 
23 454 U.S. 235, 248–50, 257 (1981). 
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to plaintiffs’ choosing a forum designed solely to harass a defend-
ant, and was expanded in Piper Aircraft to prevent forum 
shopping by foreign plaintiffs who wished to litigate in United 
States courts.24  While the Supreme Court recognized that defer-
ence may be accorded to domestic plaintiffs and their choice of 
forum, less deference was given to foreign plaintiffs suing in a 
United States court.25  Yet, even before this determination is made, 
the federal court is required to assess whether an adequate 
alternative forum exists in which the plaintiff may bring suit.  
Thus, the first question a court must address in any forum 
non conveniens analysis is how to determine if an alternate 
forum is available to a plaintiff that justifies granting a motion to 
dismiss based on forum non conveniens.  By mandating that an 
alternative forum be adequate, the Supreme Court implicitly 
recognized that a forum non conveniens dismissal may not 
prevent the plaintiffs from having their day in court.  The 
Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft, however, fashioned a rather 
incomplete test for the lower courts with regard to an adequate 
alternative forum by stating that a forum is ordinarily available 
when “the defendant is ‘amenable to process’ in the other 
jurisdiction.”26  The Court then obfuscated the point by following 
up with the statement that this rule was not absolute: 
[W]here the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly 
unsatisfactory, the other forum may not be an adequate 
alternative, and the initial requirement may not be satisfied.  
Thus, for example, dismissal would not be appropriate where 
the alternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject 
matter of the dispute.27 
Unfortunately for plaintiffs attempting to invoke forum non 
conveniens, the Supreme Court, in its limited analysis of adequate 
available forum, failed to distinguish between an inadequate fo-
rum and an inadequate remedy.  Does this gap in the analysis 
mean that an inadequate remedy makes the forum inadequate?  
Or is it inadequate only when there is no remedy at all?  Or when 
the litigation cannot occur at all?  Further, the Supreme Court 
failed to address other factors that might impact the adequacy of 
the alternative forum, such as the lack of sufficient procedural 
process or the fundamental fairness of the court system in the 
 
24 Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 507; Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 251–52.  
25 Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255–56. 
26 Id. at 254 n.22. 
27 Id. 
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other forum.  The result of the Supreme Court’s vague policy po-
sition has been that lower courts and commentators have applied 
a variety of methods and tests to evaluate the adequacy of an 
available forum.  
According to Joel Samuels in his article, “When Is an 
Alternative Forum Available? Rethinking the Forum Non 
Conveniens Analysis,” a new test is required to decide how and 
when judges should apply the alternate available forum 
determination.28  In his article, Samuels proceeds to lay out a 
six-factor test for the judiciary to use in its evaluation of whether 
the alternate forum is truly available.29  In order to qualify as an 
alternative forum, Samuels suggests looking at the alternative 
forum with respect to “jurisdiction, meaningful remedy, fair 
treatment of parties, access to the courts, procedural due process, 
and stability of the forum.”30  However, Samuels’ argument, while 
cogent and correct, does not go far enough.  While his factors test 
provides additional resources for the decision on an available 
forum, the wrong entity is interpreting those factors.  The judi-
ciary is not the optimal branch for reviewing whether an 
alternative available forum exists. 
While not taking a position on whether these factors repre-
sent the universe of potentiality with respect to qualifications for 
an alternate available forum, this Article advocates that the 
executive branch is uniquely positioned to review these factors 
and provide an opinion to the courts on whether the alternate 
forum is indeed an adequate one.  Before reaching this discus-
sion, Part I of this Article introduces forum non conveniens 
through the Supreme Court’s rulings in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert31 
and Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.32  Once the foundations for forum 
non conveniens are established, Part II of this Article turns to a 
survey of cases that have been decided on the basis of whether an 
adequate available forum existed or not.  At the core of the Arti-
cle’s analysis of adequate available forum, Part III specifically 
analyzes lower court decisions assessing the adequacy of an 
alternative forum by categorizing these decisions either as ones 
that focus on the alternative forum’s judicial capacity or upon 
 
28 Joel H. Samuels, When Is an Alternative Forum Available? Rethinking the 
Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 85 IND. L.J. 1059, 1081 (2010). 
29 Id. at 1061. 
30 Id. at 1081. 
31 330 U.S. 501 (1947). 
32 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
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factors that impact international relations and how these catego-
rizations implicate separation of powers.  Part IV of the Article 
then explains the separation of powers doctrine through original 
understanding, historical practice, and constitutional structure.  
Finally, Part V demonstrates why, from a separation of powers 
perspective, courts should defer to the Executive in determining 
an adequate alternative forum when the case implicates 
international relations.  
I.  “IN THE BEGINNING”—THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS 
The Supreme Court in Gulf Oil v. Gilbert made its first foray 
into developing a federal standard for forum non conveniens by 
adopting a doctrine intended solely to prevent plaintiffs from 
choosing a forum for the exclusive purpose of harassing the de-
fendant.33  The Court stated that the plaintiff was not allowed to 
choose a forum that would “ ‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defen-
dant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to 
[the plaintiff’s] own right to pursue his remedy.”34 
The parties in Gulf Oil were both United States citizens, and 
the jurisprudence as set forth by the Supreme Court was 
designed to prevent what the Court perceived as injustice to the 
defendant.  The plaintiff in Gulf Oil operated a warehouse in 
Lynchburg, Virginia, where he lived.35  The defendant, Gulf Oil, a 
Pennsylvania corporation, qualified to do business in both 
Virginia and New York, was alleged to have negligently delivered 
a shipment of gasoline to the plaintiff’s warehouse and its 
pumps.36  This shipment exploded and destroyed the plaintiff’s 
warehouse.37  Plaintiff initiated his lawsuit in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York, and the 
defendant moved to dismiss the action to Virginia based on the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens.38  The Southern District of New 
York agreed with the defendant and dismissed the case to 
Virginia.39  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
 
33 330 U.S. at 507–09. 
34 Id. at 508. 
35 Id. at 502. 
36 Id. at 502–03. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 503. 
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Circuit disagreed and reversed.40  The Supreme Court agreed 
with the district court’s order granting the forum non conveniens 
request transferring the case from New York to Virginia.41  
In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court based its de-
termination on a careful balancing of both private and public 
interest factors.  Private interest factors weighed by the court 
included  
the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of 
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of 
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of 
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all 
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, 
expeditious and inexpensive.42 
The court may also account for the “enforcibility [sic] of a 
judgment” and the “relative advantages and obstacles to fair 
trial.”43  Public interest factors that the court will balance are 
“[a]dministrative difficulties” that arise from “congested” court 
dockets, “[j]ury duty” for individuals who do not have any 
“relation to the litigation,” “local interest[s] in having contro-
versies decided” in the home forum, and questions of which law 
will govern.44  Prior to weighing the private and public factors, 
the court explained that unless the “balance is strongly in favor 
of the defendant,” the plaintiff’s choice of forum should be given 
great deference.45  Additionally, the Court implicitly assumed the 
adequacy of the alternative forum by stating that a forum non 
conveniens analysis “presupposes at least two forums in which 
the defendant is amenable to process.”46  In Gulf Oil, the alter-
nate available forum was either a state or federal court in 
Virginia, where the defendant was amenable to process; as a 
result the Supreme Court did not engage in an analysis of this 
issue.47  
As both forums in Gulf Oil were in the United States, the 
Supreme Court simply assumed the adequacy of either forum.48  
One year later, judicial application of forum non conveniens with re-
 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 512. 
42 Id. at 508. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 508–09. 
45 Id. at 508. 
46 Id. at 507. 
47 Id. at 503. 
48 Id. at 506–07. 
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spect to dismissal from one federal court to another federal court 
became a non-issue with the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), 
which allowed cases to be transferred from one federal district to 
another, provided that both forums had proper jurisdiction and 
venue.49  Since this statute involved the transfer of a case from 
one district court to another, by virtue of its application, it was 
unnecessary to address whether the transferee court was an 
adequate available forum.  It was not until thirty-four years later 
that the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the adequacy of 
an available forum with respect to dismissal to a foreign court in 
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.50   
In Piper Aircraft, the Supreme Court elucidated the modern 
application of forum non conveniens that courts are still applying 
today.  Piper Aircraft involved a wrongful death action that arose 
from an airplane crash in Scotland that resulted in the death of 
several Scottish citizens.51  Reyno, the legal secretary of the attor-
ney representing the plaintiffs who was appointed the rep-
resentative of the Scottish decedents’ estates, filed wrongful 
death litigation on behalf of the five decedents in California state 
court.52  The defendants, Piper Aircraft Co. and Hartzell Propel-
ler, Inc., were a Pennsylvania company that manufactured the 
plane and an Ohio company that manufactured the plane’s 
propellers.53  When the crash occurred, the plane was registered 
in Great Britain and was owned and operated by United 
Kingdom companies.54  The defendants successfully removed the 
action to the United States District Court for the Central District 
of California and then, utilizing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), transferred 
the case to the United States District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania.55  After transferring to the Middle District 
of Pennsylvania, the defendants argued that the case should be 
dismissed to Scotland on the grounds of forum non conveniens.56  
Applying the private and public factors expounded in Gulf Oil 
Co. v. Gilbert, the district court granted the motion to dismiss.57  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re-
 
49 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2018). 
50 454 U.S. 235, 238 (1981). 
51 Id. at 238–40. 
52 Id. at 239–40. 
53 Id. at 239.  
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 240. 
56 Id. at 241. 
57 Id. 
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versed the district court based partly on its analysis of adequacy 
of Scotland as an alternative forum.58  Specifically, the Third 
Circuit determined that Scotland would not be an adequate 
forum because the law of the transferee forum would be less 
favorable to the plaintiff.59 
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and 
granted dismissal based on forum non conveniens.60  In reaching 
its decision, the Court “shifted and enlarged the Gilbert standard 
from simply preventing vexation or harassment to also include 
preventing forum shopping.”61  While the Court agreed that the 
first step in a forum non conveniens analysis was whether an 
adequate available forum existed, it took issue with the Third 
Circuit’s formulation of the adequacy test.  The Court stated: 
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that plaintiffs may 
defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non 
conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that 
would be applied in the alternative forum is less favorable to 
the plaintiffs than that of the present forum.  The possibility of 
a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given 
conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non 
conveniens inquiry.62 
The Court, however, then placed a caveat on its decision by 
indicating that unfavorable substantive law may be a relevant 
consideration, stating that “if the remedy provided by the 
alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that 
it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be 
given substantial weight.”63  
According to the Piper Court, an alternative forum is deemed 
available as long as the defendant is “amenable to [service of] 
process,” except in “rare circumstances” when “the remedy of-
fered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory.”64  While the 
possible damages that plaintiffs could recover in Scotland was far 
less than what was available in the United States, this difference 
did not render Scotland an inadequate forum.65  Less favorable 
 
58 Id. at 244–45.  
59 Id. at 244. 
60 Id. at 247, 261.  
61 Megan Walpes, Note, The Adequate Alternative Forum Analysis in Forum Non 
Conveniens: A Case for Reform, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1475, 1482 (2004). 
62 Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 247. 
63 Id. at 254.  
64 Id. at 254 n.22. 
65 Id. at 254–55. 
2020] A SEPARATION OF POWERS ANALYSIS 167 
did not mean less adequate.  The Supreme Court’s formulation of 
adequacy of an available forum, however, failed to distinguish be-
tween an inadequate forum and an inadequate remedy.  Rather, 
the Court seems to imply that the one equates with the other.   
[W]here the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly 
unsatisfactory, the other forum may not be an adequate alter-
native, and the initial requirement may not be satisfied.  Thus, 
for example, dismissal would not be appropriate where the 
alternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject 
matter in dispute.66 
This approach is quite dissatisfying.  It equates a question of 
law that is suited to determination by the courts, that is, whether 
the remedy is adequate, with a question of foreign policy, that is, 
whether the very forum itself is adequate—a question that impli-
cates executive power and is best left in the hands of the 
Executive to decide.  Further, in reaching its decision, the Court 
failed to directly address “procedural safeguards, practical con-
siderations, or concerns regarding the fundamental fairness of 
the court.”67  The Supreme Court’s failure to address these criti-
cal components regarding an adequate available forum has 
allowed federal courts to take inconsistent and divergent 
positions on what constitutes an adequate foreign forum, how to 
appropriately address the actual procedural and practical weak-
nesses in dismissing cases to foreign forums, and how to address 
the competency or impartiality of a foreign court.  Lower courts 
that have attempted to answer these questions in their adequate 
available forum analyses have focused their analyses on either 
the forum’s inherent judicial ability or upon international 
relations and foreign policy considerations—a dichotomy that 
implicates and begs for a separation of powers analysis.  In order 
to further explicate this point, representative lower courts’ 




66 Id. at 254 n.22. Once the Supreme Court determined that an adequate 
available forum existed, it then decided that “a foreign plaintiff’s choice [of forum] 
deserves less deference” than the deference provided to United States plaintiffs who 
are litigating in federal courts. Id. at 256. The Court then reviewed the private 
interests and the public interests as set forth originally in Gilbert, holding that the 
balance of interests favored the defendants, and dismissed the case to Scotland. Id. 
at 257.  
67 Walpes, supra note 61, at 1484. 
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II.  LITTLE RHYME OR REASON—FEDERAL COURTS 
AND ADEQUATE AVAILABLE FORUM ANALYSES 
Analyzing forum non conveniens with respect to a determina-
tion of an adequate available forum presents several challenges, 
not the least of which is the lack of reported decisions.  Addition-
ally, according to Joel Samuels, who reviewed 1,447 forum non 
conveniens cases for his 2010 article, courts conducted adequate 
available forum analyses in only 999 of those cases—which is 
sixty-nine percent—even though, according to the dictates of 
Piper Aircraft, such an analysis should be required in one 
hundred percent of the cases.68  Further, based on the Piper 
Aircraft decision, some courts have viewed the determination on 
the adequacy of the available forum as a low threshold.69  With 
these points in mind, this Section will review forum non 
conveniens cases, not to be a comprehensive analysis of the topic, 
but rather to demonstrate the difficulties and inconsistencies 
involved in federal courts attempting to apply a standard for 
adequate available forum.  
Many courts simply bypass the adequate available forum 
analysis by assuming or merely stating that the forum is “adequate” 
without any analysis of the issue whatsoever.  For instance, in 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., the court 
decided that Canada was an adequate forum to determine plain-
tiffs’ claims of genocide, specifically stating that it “assume[d], 
without deciding, that plaintiffs would be able to receive a fair 
trial in Canada, notwithstanding the fact that Talisman is a Ca-
nadian company.”70  Instead of requiring the defendant to demon-
strate that Canada was an adequate forum, the court relied on 
the fact that the plaintiffs failed to challenge the adequacy of 
Canada as an adequate available forum, which effectively shifted 
the burden of proof on this issue to the plaintiffs.71  Likewise, in 
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Inversiones Errazuriz, Limitada, 
the plaintiffs sought recovery of “over $100 million pursuant to 
 
68 Samuels, supra note 28, at 1077. 
69 See, e.g., Princeton Football Partners LLC v. Football Ass’n of Ir., No. 11-5227, 
2012 WL 2995199, at *4 (D.N.J. Jul. 23, 2012) (citing Tech. Dev. Co. v. Onischenko, 
174 F. App’x 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Inadequacy of the alternative forum is rarely a 
barrier to forum non conveniens dismissal.”)). 
70 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 
336–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d, 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009). 
71 Id. at 337–38; see also, e.g., Int’l Equity Invs., Inc. v. Cico, 427 F. Supp. 2d 
503, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that “the Court assumes that Brazil provides an 
adequate alternative forum”). 
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two Credit Agreements.”72  After settlement talks failed and the 
plaintiff filed and received a default judgment, the defendants ap-
peared to challenge the default judgment and to assert defenses, 
including forum non conveniens.73  In reviewing the forum non 
conveniens claim, the court recognized that the inquiry was a 
two-step process, with the “first step” being “to determine if an 
adequate available forum exists.”74  However, the court failed to 
engage in such an analysis, but rather, relied on the fact that the 
“plaintiff [did] not challenge the adequacy of the alternative 
forum in Chile,” which abrogated its responsibility to engage in a 
rigorous analysis of this critical first step in a forum non 
conveniens analysis.75  Conversely, in Technology Development Co. 
v. Onischenko, the Third Circuit reversed the district court, 
stating that a more exacting analysis of adequate available forum 
is necessary prior to dismissal.76 “[T]he District Court should 
have done more than simply conclude that Russia provides an 
adequate forum without any discussion whatsoever of the reme-
dies available in Russia or any citation to cases supporting the 
view that the Russian courts are adequate to handle disputes of 
this nature.”77 
When federal courts provide any analysis of forum non 
conveniens, without any explicit guidance from the Supreme 
Court, they often focus on myriad factors.  Some courts will look 
to the defendant’s amenability to process in the other forum, and, 
provided that this requirement is met, will find that the alterna-
tive forum is adequate.  A corollary to this position is to consider 
certain procedural issues within the analysis of adequate 
available forum.  These procedural safeguards, when analyzed, 
often will not render a foreign forum inadequate.  Some courts in 
their adequate available forum analyses look at the “soundness 
and procedural fairness of that society’s court system.”78  In Flynn 
v. General Motors, Inc., the defendant asserted that Trinidad and 
 
72 State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Inversiones Errazuriz, Limitada, 230 F. Supp. 2d 
313, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
73 Id. at 315–16, 319. 
74 Id. at 319. 
75 Id.; see also, e.g., DR Music, Inc. v. Aramini Strumenti Musicali S.R.L., No. 
13-7028, 2014 WL 523042, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2014) (finding that “it appears that 
there is an alternative forum, i.e. the Italian courts” because the defendant indicated 
that it was amenable to process in Italy). 
76 Tech. Dev. Co. v. Onischenko, 174 F. App’x 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2006). 
77 Id. 
78 Flynn v. Gen. Motors, Inc., 141 F.R.D. 5, 8 (E.D.N.Y 1992) (quoting Murty v. 
Aga Khan, 92 F.R.D. 478, 482 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)). 
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Tobago was an adequate forum as its court system would allow 
the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard and could provide a 
remedy for the injuries suffered due to the defective products.79  
The plaintiffs conversely argued that Trinidad and Tobago was 
an inadequate forum, relying on the position that Trinidad and 
Tobago’s court system did not “provide jury trials in civil cases.”80  
The court determined Trinidad and Tobago was an adequate 
forum as “Plaintiff ha[d] failed to show that the Trinidad and 
Tobago judicial system lack[ed] appropriate procedural safe-
guards.”81  Absent procedural inadequacies, the court held that 
“principles of comity preclude[d] characterizing the judicial 
system of Trinidad and Tobago as any less fair than our own.”82  
Other procedural shortcomings likewise have not prevented 
federal courts from finding that the forum was an adequate 
alternative.  Neither restrictions on discovery nor denial of oral 
cross-examinations have led courts to decide that a foreign forum 
was inadequate.  In Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.,83 Ecuador was found 
to be an adequate available forum despite plaintiffs’ arguments 
that Ecuadorian tort law was insufficiently developed and that 
class actions were unavailable in Ecuador.84  Plaintiffs also 
argued that procedural deficiencies, including protracted admin-
istrative proceedings prior to suit, “restrictions on discovery,” 
limitations on cross-examination, and limitations on experts, 
existed that rendered Ecuador an inadequate forum.85  The court 
found each of these rationales for an inadequate forum 
unpersuasive.86  Likewise, in In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas 
Plant Disaster (Bhopal Litigation), the plaintiffs raised several 
 
79 Id. at 8. 
80 Id. at 9. 
81 Id.; see also, e.g., Murty, 92 F.R.D at 482 (“Where the traditions and powers of 
a foreign judiciary are uncertain an American court should not dismiss a case ‘with-
out resort to a comparison of alternative procedural safeguards.’ ” (quoting Phoenix 
Can. Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445, 455 (D. Del. 1978), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 842 F.2d 1466 (3d Cir. 1988))). 
82 Flynn, 141 F.R.D. at 9 (quoting Murty, 92 F.R.D at 482) (finding that 
“[p]rinciples of comity as well as common knowledge preclude our characterizing the 
French judicial system as any less fair than our own”). 
83 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d as modified, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
84 Id. at 539–42.  
85 Id. at 542–43. 
86 Id. at 539–43. The Aguinda court also addressed that Ecuador was an unsat-
isfactory alternative forum based on the claim that the Ecuadorian judiciary was 
corrupt. Id. at 543. This argument is addressed below. See infra text accompanying 
notes 107–178. 
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procedural and practical issues with respect to India as an 
adequate forum, including the underdevelopment and “lack of 
sophistication [of] Indian tort law,” the court system’s inability to 
manage complex tort litigation, limitations on the availability of 
discovery, and the unavailability of class action devices and “con-
tingent fee arrangements.”87  The court reviewed each of these 
arguments and determined that the “courts of India appear to be 
well up to the task of handling this case.”88 
By contrast, the Fifth Circuit does not focus on procedural 
practicalities in its adequate available forum analysis, but rather 
focuses on whether the parties will have some form of legal 
remedy in the foreign forum and will be treated fairly.  For in-
stance, in Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., the court reviewed 
whether German courts could provide an adequate available 
forum for an action on behalf of German citizens who died in an 
airplane crash in Germany.89  The court found that the German 
civil code allowed for jurisdiction in the German courts.90  The 
court held that “[a] foreign forum is available when the entire 
case and all parties can come within the jurisdiction of that 
forum.”91  Further, “[a] foreign forum is adequate when the parties 
will not be deprived of all remedies or treated unfairly, even 
though they may not enjoy the same benefits as they might 
receive in an American court.”92 
The Fifth Circuit took this analysis to its ultimate and 
logical conclusion in Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., when the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas consoli-
dated several suits filed in Texas regarding the use of the pesti-
cide that contained the chemical dibromochloropropane—
DBCP.93  The pesticide, manufactured by Dow Chemical and Shell 
Oil, had been banned from use in the United States due to claims 
of “sterility, testicular atrophy, miscarriages, liver damage, can-
cer and other ailments,”94 but was still distributed for use in  
 
 
87 634 F. Supp. 842, 848–53 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d as modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d 
Cir. 1987). 
88 Id. at 852. 
89 981 F.2d 824, 827 (5th Cir. 1993). 
90 Id. at 835. 
91 Id. (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster, 821 F.2d 1147, 1165 (5th Cir. 1987)). 
92 Id. (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster, 821 F.2d at 1165). 
93 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1335 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff’d, 231 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2000). 
94 Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d in part, 
cert. dismissed in part, 538 U.S. 468 (2003). 
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developing nations, including “Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Dominica, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Nicaragua, Panama, 
the Philippines, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent.”95 
After addressing myriad procedural issues, the district court 
turned to the forum non conveniens analysis and tackled the 
question of adequate available forum.  The court started its in-
quiry by stating that “[a] foreign forum is adequate when the 
parties will not be deprived of all remedies or treated unfairly 
even though they may not enjoy the same benefits as they might 
receive in an American court.”96  The plaintiffs raised numerous 
substantive and procedural deficiencies, including the lack of 
contingent fee arrangements, vastly lower monetary awards, lack 
of civil juries, inability to recover for non-economic losses and 
punitive damages, restrictions on witnesses and the ability to 
testify, and discovery limitations.97  The court ruled that these 
concerns were not relevant to the analysis of adequate available 
forum, but rather weighed into the analysis of the litigants’ 
private interests.98  Based on this standard, the court found that 
all twelve forums were adequate based primarily on affidavits of 
the parties’ expert witnesses who advised on the ability to 
recover for injuries under the various forums’ legal regimes.99  
The court, however, failed to address critical issues such as the 
judicial system’s independence, reliability, or ability in each 
foreign country.  Likewise, in DeSirey v. Unique Vacations, the 
court engaged in little to no analysis of critical factors that 
should encompass the adequate available forum.  In determining 
whether St. Lucia was an adequate forum for a negligence claim, 
the District Court of the Eastern District of Missouri instead 
relied on the assurances of the defendant’s expert witness, an 
attorney from the foreign forum, that the forum was adequate to 
hear the tort claim and on judicial precedent that St. Lucia 
provided an adequate forum.100   
The Eleventh Circuit, however, recognized the inherent 
conflict in courts’ engaging in an adequate available forum 
analysis with respect to a foreign forum judicial system’s 
 
95 Delgado, 890 F. Supp. at 1337 (footnote omitted). 
96 Id. at 1356 (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster, 821 F.2d at 1165). 
97 Id. at 1357 n.79. 
98 Id. at 1365. 
99 Id. at 1335, 1358–65, 1369, 1371. 
100 DeSirey v. Unique Vacations, Inc., No. 4:13 CV 881 RWS, 2014 WL 272369, 
at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 24, 2014). 
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independence, reliability, and ability.  In Esfeld v. Costa Crociere, 
S.P.A., the court rightly noted that “foreign relations are impli-
cated in the forum non conveniens calculus,” thus “federal courts 
necessarily must analyze the interest that the foreign country 
has in the dispute, an analysis that may raise issues of interna-
tional comity.”101  In this regard, while courts require defendants 
to demonstrate that the forum offer some remedy, courts “have 
not always required that defendants do much to refute allega-
tions of partiality and inefficiency in the alternative forum.”102  In 
fact, the Second Circuit has stated that “considerations of comity 
preclude a court from adversely judging the quality of a foreign 
justice system absent a showing of inadequate procedural safe-
guards.”103  
Expert witness testimony is often relied upon in assessing 
the adequacy of a foreign forum.  In Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., Ec-
uadorian citizens filed suit in the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Florida to recover for fatalities suffered 
by Ecuadorian residents resulting from an airline crash in 
Ecuador.104  Affidavits were filed by both American and Ecua-
dorian lawyers affirming the adequacy of the Ecuadorian judicial 
system.105  Plaintiffs contested this assertion, alleging the Ecua-
dorian legal system was “in turmoil and had been recently shut 
down by a strike of the judges.”106   
The court began its adequate alternative forum analysis by 
articulating that “[a]vailability and adequacy warrant separate 
consideration.”107  A forum is available when jurisdiction may be 
asserted over the litigation, that is, when the defendant is “ame-
nable to process” in the foreign jurisdiction.108  A forum is adequate 
when the defendant has demonstrated that “the alternative 
forum offers at least some relief.”109  However, while “[a]n adequate 
forum need not be a perfect forum,” the Eleventh Circuit did note 
 
101 289 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 2002). 
102 Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001).  
103 PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1998). 
104 251 F.3d at 1308. 
105 Id. at 1309. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 1311 (citing Satz v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 244 F.3d 1279, 1283 
(11th Cir. 2001)).  
108 Id. (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981)).  
109 Id. For example, the First Circuit reversed a forum non conveniens dismissal 
when the defendant did not prove that claims for breach of contract and tortious 
interference with contract were recognized causes of action under Turkish law. 
Mercier v. Sheraton Int’l, Inc., 935 F.2d 419, 425 (1st Cir. 1991). 
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that “extreme amounts of partiality or inefficiency may render 
the alternative forum inadequate.”110  In making this determina-
tion, the court held that the defendants had “the ultimate burden 
of persuasion” on the issue, but only after the plaintiffs had 
sufficiently substantiated the allegations of inefficiency, delay, or 
corruption.111  In analyzing the efficiency and impartiality of the 
Ecuadorian courts, the court determined—without any concerns 
about comity or hesitancy about the impact on foreign relations—
that the plaintiff had failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the 
Ecuadorian court could neither reasonably nor expeditiously 
adjudicate the wrongful death claims presented in the litigation, 
and thus Ecuador presented an adequate forum for the 
litigation.112 
An outlier in the adequate available forum analysis and one 
that definitively demonstrates the confusion caused by the 
Supreme Court’s lack of guidance is the Eighth Circuit’s opinion 
in Reid-Walen v. Hansen, where the court seemed to conflate the 
issue of adequacy with the private factors of convenience of the 
parties.113  The district court had dismissed the case under forum 
non conveniens in favor of the foreign forum of Jamaica.114  The 
Eighth Circuit disagreed and reversed the district court, pri-
marily based on the fact that the district court failed to assess 
the plaintiff’s ability to litigate in Jamaica.115  The court was 
specifically cognizant of “the realities of the plaintiff’s position, 
financial and otherwise, and his or her ability as a practical mat-
ter to bring suit in the alternative forum.”116  The Eighth Circuit, 
in reversing the district court, took into consideration that 
“trying the case in Jamaica was so infeasible, both practically 
and financially, that Reid-Walen would not pursue the matter if 
unable to litigate in her chosen forum . . . .  In this case, the 
 
110 Leon, 251 F.3d at 1311–12. Excessive delays in the litigation may make the 
forum so inefficient as to render it an inadequate forum. See, e.g., Bhatnagar v. 
Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1228 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that the Indian 
court was an inefficient and hence inadequate forum when delays of up to twenty-
five years were possible). 
111 Leon, 251 F.3d at 1312. 
112 Id. at 1314. 
113 933 F.2d 1390, 1401 (8th Cir. 1991). 
114 Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 715 F. Supp. 270, 272 (E.D. Mo. 1989), rev’d, 933 F.2d 
1390 (8th Cir. 1991). 
115 Reid-Walen, 933 F.2d at 1401. 
116 Id. at 1398 (quoting Lehman v. Humphrey Cayman, Ltd., 713 F.2d 339, 346 
(8th Cir. 1983)). 
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‘alternative forum’ is really not much of a forum at all.”117  Thus, 
this decision demonstrates how federal courts have struggled 
with addressing the procedural and practical problems that 
encompass the alternative available forum analysis.  
In addition to reviewing procedural and practical difficulties 
in an adequate alternative forum analysis, the courts often are 
called upon to address the adequacy of a foreign forum based on 
allegations of corruption, disorder, and poorly developed juris-
prudence.  While these issues are often affirmatively raised, the 
courts have seldom ruled in plaintiffs’ favor, instead relying on 
international comity to find that “[i]t is not the business of our 
courts to assume the responsibility for supervising the integrity 
of the judicial system of another sovereign nation.”118 
In 1997, in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida established the 
high standard that subsequent courts have emulated in 
evaluating whether a court should invalidate the adequacy of a 
foreign forum on the basis of corruption.119  In Kavlin, the de-
fendant Casa Kavlin was a Bolivian distributor for Kodak, 
distributing goods such as “photographic laboratory equipment, 
films, graphic arts materials, x-ray materials, and microfilm.”120  
After a period of time, Kodak decided it was not satisfied with its 
relationship with Casa Kavlin and sent a representative to 
survey the Bolivian market.121  Shortly thereafter, Kodak in-
formed Casa Kavlin that it was terminating its relationship and 
the representative sent by Kodak “would be responsible for 
Kodak sales, supplies distribution, and representation in 
Bolivia.”122  Casa Kavlin then filed a written criminal complaint 
against the Kodak representative that included “falsifying docu-
ments, espionage against Casa Kavlin, [and] stealing Casa 
Kavlin’s clients.”123  These allegations resulted in the issuance of 
an arrest warrant, the representative’s appearance before a judge 
that was the godfather of the child of Casa Kavlin’s attorney, and 
the representative’s eventual incarceration in a rat-infested 
prison alongside murderers and drug dealers for eight days, 
 
117 Id. at 1399. 
118 Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting 
Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484–85 (2d Cir. 1976)).  
119 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1084–85 (S.D. Fla. 1997). 
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which he survived only by “buy[ing] the right to live in a jail cell 
for $5,000.”124  Casa Kavlin also arranged for the attorney of 
Kodak’s representative and two other Kodak employees to be 
charged as criminal co-conspirators.125  All four individuals were 
subsequently convicted by the Bolivian court in absentia and 
each sentenced to five years in prison.126  
Casa Kavlin then brought civil suit against Kodak in Bolivia, 
in which it sought $10 million in damages.127  Kodak, in turn, 
sued Casa Kavlin in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida, alleging various causes of actions 
under Bolivian law “including extortion, false accusation and 
denunciation, exercise of monopoly of work, and a declaratory 
judgment that Casa Kavlin is not entitled to the relief it seeks in 
its Bolivian complaint.”128  Kodak’s representative also sued Casa 
Kavlin claiming that its actions in having him jailed in order to 
extort Kodak violated “the law of nations.”129  The defendant 
moved to dismiss the complaint filed in United States federal 
court on grounds that included lack of personal jurisdiction and 
forum non conveniens.130   
With respect to the forum non conveniens argument, the 
“[p]laintiffs essentially argue[d] that the Courts of Bolivia are so 
corrupt and slow as to make fair and timely resolution of their 
claims highly unlikely.”131  The district court began its analysis of 
whether an adequate available forum existed by noting the 
argument that “[t]he ‘alternative forum is too corrupt to be 
adequate’ . . . [and] does not enjoy a particularly impressive track 
record.”132  In fact, the court specifically noted that it was unable 
to locate any published opinion that adopted the position that a 
forum was inadequate due to corruption in the judicial system.133  
 
124 Id. at 1080–81. Casa Kavlin allegedly attempted to extort Kodak in exchange 
for dropping the charges against its representative. Id. 
125 Id. at 1081. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 1081–82. 
129 Id. at 1082. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 1084. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. However, the court noted a number of jurisdictions where this particular 
argument had been specifically rejected. Id.; see Blanco v. Banco Indus. de Venez., 
S.A., 997 F.2d 974, 981–82 (2d Cir. 1993) (determining that Venezuela was not an 
inadequate forum even though plaintiff presented evidence of corruption when the 
parties named Venezuela the chosen forum through a forum selection clause); 
Mercier v. Sheraton Int’l, Inc., 981 F.2d 1345, 1351 (1st Cir. 1992) (concluding that 
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Since Kodak had transacted business in Bolivia for seventy 
years, the court reasoned that absent a compelling counterargu-
ment, “having made its bed in Bolivia, Kodak should lie there 
too.”134  Yet, the court found that the overwhelming evidence 
presented by the plaintiffs, including comments by the Bolivian 
Minister of Justice,135 noted legal scholars,136 Bolivian govern-
ment officials,137 and official United States government reports,138 
provided ample justification to doubt the adequacy of Bolivia as 
an alternative forum.  While the defendants “vigorously” disputed 
that they manipulated the Bolivian judicial system and that 
corruption was not as rampant as alleged by the plaintiff, the 
court ultimately concluded that defendants did not meet the 
“burden of proving the existence of an adequate available forum,” 
and thus the court denied the motion to dismiss on the grounds 
of forum non conveniens.139 
 
Turkey was an adequate forum even though plaintiff alleged that Turkish judiciary 
had a “ ‘profound bias’ against Americans and foreign women”); Torres v. S. Peru 
Copper Corp., 965 F. Supp. 899, 903 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that Peru was not an 
inadequate available forum as insufficient evidence was provided to demonstrate 
that Peruvian courts were corrupt), aff’d, 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997); Banco 
Mercantil, S.A. v. Hernandez Arencibia, 927 F. Supp. 565, 567–68 (D.P.R. 1996) 
(rejecting the argument that Dominican Republic courts were “so . . . corrupt as 
to . . . provide an [in]adequate available forum”). 
134 Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. at 1085. 
135 According to the court, “[a] Bolivian newspaper article published September 
20, 1996, quotes the Minister of Justice as saying that ‘the current judicial system is 
a collection agency and the penal system is an agent of extorsion [sic].’ ” Id. at 1085. 
136 Professor Keith S. Rosenn of the University of Miami Law School, based on 
World Bank and State Department reports, cited widespread corruption in the 
Bolivian courts. Id. Professor Eduardo A. Gamarra of Florida International Univer-
sity stated “bribery of judges, attorneys, and even Supreme Court justices [was] a 
routine practice. . . . Bribery range[d] from relatively small to extremely high 
amounts. . . . In 1991, eight members of the Supreme Court were charged with acts 
of corruption.” Id. (second alteration in original). 
137 Luis Peñarana, a Bolivian lawyer who was the legal counsel to the Bolivian 
House of Representatives judicial oversight commission, stated “ ‘[c]orruption [was] 
endemic to the judicial system of Bolivia,’ existing ‘at all levels of the system.’ ” Id. 
(first alteration in original). 
138 The State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1995 
submitted to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
House Committee on International Relations stated “[t]he justice system . . . is 
overburdened, afflicted by the corruption of some judges, and lacking public 
credibility. . . . Judges are underpaid, poorly disciplined, and susceptible to political 
influence. . . . [M]ajor political parties influence the judicial selection process and 
decisions in particular cases.” Id. at 1086 (second and third alterations in original). 
139 Id. at 1086–87. 
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As noted by the Kavlin court itself, this case is an anomaly in 
the universe of adequate available forum cases.140  In 2006, the 
Ninth Circuit was called upon to address the allegations of 
corruption in the Philippine courts as the basis to deny a forum 
non conveniens motion.  In Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
the plaintiff, Tuazon, smoked Salem cigarettes for more than 
forty years, was eventually diagnosed with chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disorder in his native country of the Philippines, and 
subsequently moved to the state of Washington.141  Tuazon sued 
R.J. Reynolds in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Washington, alleging that Reynolds engaged in an 
effort to “suppress information regarding the addictive and 
health-related effects of cigarettes.”142  After finding that the dis-
trict court had properly asserted personal jurisdiction over the 
case, the Ninth Circuit had to address Reynolds’ motion to 
dismiss based on forum non conveniens, starting with plaintiff’s 
claims that the Philippines failed to provide an adequate 
available forum since the “Philippine courts [were] too corrupt 
and plagued with delays.”143  Unlike the significant evidentiary 
support presented in Kavlin, Tuazon relied “on his own experi-
ence as a lawyer and businessman in the Philippines” and upon 
State Department reports that detailed “corruption, judicial 
bias[,] and inefficiency” in the Philippine court system, but which 
were primarily “focused on human rights in the Philippines, and 
the criminal justice system.”144  While the Ninth Circuit recog-
nized that a forum may be inadequate if the “legal system [was] 
so fraught with corruption, delay[,] and bias as to provide ‘no 
remedy at all,’ ” the evidence offered by the plaintiff did not 
overcome R.J. Reynolds’ arguments that the Philippines was an 
adequate available forum.145  
Likewise, Peru was determined to be an adequate available 
forum in Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. despite allega-
tions of widespread discrimination and corruption in the 
 
140 Id. at 1087.  
141 433 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2006). 
142 Id. at 1168. 
143 Id. at 1177–78. 
144 Id. at 1178–79. 
145 Id. at 1179. While the Ninth Circuit therefore determined that the district 
court’s finding of inadequacy of the Philippines forum was not supported, it ulti-
mately upheld the district court’s denial of R.J. Reynolds’ forum non conveniens 
motion based on a balancing of the private and public factors that weighed in favor 
of retaining the litigation in the United States. Id. at 1179–80, 1181. 
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Peruvian judicial system.146  According to the complaint filed in 
Carijano, Occidental knowingly “discharge[d] millions of gallons 
of toxic oil byproducts” into the rivers of the northern Peruvian 
rainforest.147  The Achuar, an indigenous people who lived in the 
Peruvian rainforest, used these polluted rivers for “drinking, 
washing, and fishing,” which allegedly resulted in, among other 
things, “gastrointestinal problems, kidney trouble, [and] skin 
rashes.”148  The Achuar asserted claims “for common law negli-
gence, strict liability, battery, medical monitoring, wrongful 
death, fraud and misrepresentation, public and private nuisance, 
trespass, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well 
as a violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law.”149  
Occidental moved to dismiss the case on the grounds of forum 
non conveniens, which the district court granted based on Peru 
being an adequate alternative forum and the balancing of private 
and public factors favoring trial in Peru.150 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether Peru was an 
adequate available forum.  After determining that Occidental was 
amenable to service of process in Peru, which established its 
adequacy as a forum, the court reviewed whether Peruvian 
courts offered the Achuar a “satisfactory remedy.”151  While the 
parties offered conflicting expert testimony, the plaintiffs argued 
that general corruption existed in the Peruvian judicial system 
that prevented the Achuar from receiving a satisfactory 
remedy.152  Specifically, plaintiffs’ experts testified to “unique 
barriers confronting the Achuar Plaintiffs in Peru due to their 
ethnicity, poverty, and isolation” and that the court system 
contributed to ongoing discrimination against the Achuar.153  
Plaintiffs’ expert asserted that the Peruvian judiciary suffered 
from “ ‘institutionalized’ corruption, including widespread lobby-
ing of judges, third party informal ‘intermediaries’ between 
magistrates and parties, and the exchange of improper favors 
and information.”154  In contrast, the expert for Occidental testi-
fied that the Peruvian judiciary had become more reliable in 
 
146 643 F.3d 1216, 1222–23, 1226 (9th Cir. 2011). 
147 Id. at 1222. 
148 Id. at 1222–23. 
149 Id. at 1223. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 1225. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 1226. 
154 Id. 
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recent years.155  In particular, he noted that the Peruvian govern-
ment was fighting corruption including “the removal and 
sanctioning of numerous judges as well as improvements in 
judicial selection procedures and court infrastructure.” 156   
The Ninth Circuit, relying on Tuazon, stated that a party 
that wants to demonstrate that a foreign forum is inadequate 
“due to corruption” bears the burden to “make a ‘powerful 
showing’ that includes specific evidence.”157  After acknowledging 
the conflicting views of the expert witnesses, the Ninth Circuit 
noted that the district court correctly recognized that “one of the 
central ends of the forum non conveniens doctrine is to avert 
‘unnecessary indictments by our judges condemning the suffi-
ciency of the courts and legal methods of other nations.’ ”158  As 
such, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s finding 
that the evidence did not support a finding that the Peruvian 
judicial system was “so fraught with corruption, delay and bias 
as to provide ‘no remedy at all.’ ”159 
However, a decidedly different result occurred in the 2015 
case In re Montage Technology Group Ltd. Securities Litiga-
tion.160  In this case, the defendant Montage was a Cayman 
Islands corporation that was “headquartered and primarily 
conducting business in China.”161  The plaintiffs were a class of 
individuals who had purchased Montage securities and who 
subsequently alleged “violations of [s]ections 10(b) and 20(a) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”162  The defendants filed a 
motion to dismiss the case under Rule 12(b)(6) “and on the 




157 Id. (quoting Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1179 (9th 
Cir. 2006)). 
158 Id. (quoting Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukr., 
158 F. Supp. 2d 377, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). See also Monegasque De Reassurances 
S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukr., 311 F.3d 488, 499 (2d. Cir. 2002) (refusing to “pass 
value judgments on the adequacy of justice and the integrity of [Ukraine’s] judicial 
system on the basis of no more than . . . bare denunciations and sweeping gen-
eralizations” (first alteration in original)); El-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 
F.3d 668, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff’s generalized allegations 
regarding the lack of impartiality in the Jordanian judicial system was not sufficient 
to find that the Jordanian courts were inadequate). 
159 Carijano, 643 F.3d at 1226–27 (quoting Tuazon, 433 F.3d at 1179). 
160 78 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1219 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 1220. 
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In addressing the forum non conveniens motion, the district 
court began its analysis by stating that the defendants must 
demonstrate “that an alternative forum exists, and that it is 
adequate.”164  The district court first determined that China was 
an available forum as the “[d]efendants [were] amendable to 
service of process in [China].”165  The question then turned to 
“whether the forum provide[d] an adequate remedy for [the] 
plaintiffs’ alleged injuries.”166 
Both the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ experts provided testimo-
ny regarding Chinese securities law and whether its application 
would allow a remedy for plaintiffs’ securities issues.  The plain-
tiffs specifically argued that Chinese law would not apply to the 
securities claims as the law governed only domestic Chinese 
securities issuances and transactions, not disputes arising from 
securities transactions that occurred in the United States.167  
Further, the plaintiffs argued that the Chinese securities law 
was only applicable once a criminal judgment was entered 
against the defendant and no such finding could occur as the 
court had “jurisdiction only over domestic securities markets.”168  
The defendants countered these arguments by asserting that, 
while the Chinese law did not specifically authorize suits against 
non-Chinese companies, it did not preclude them, and that the 
inability of the courts to issue a criminal judgment did not 
preclude the court from issuing a remedy in a private securities 
fraud case.169  While the court refused to resolve the issues of 
Chinese law raised by the experts, it found that the defendants’ 
rebuttal of plaintiffs’ experts relied on “speculation as to what 
[Chinese] courts could do.  They could interpret the [applicable] 
Regulations to include jurisdiction over foreign securities 
transaction . . . and could waive the typical prerequisites to bring 
securities fraud suits.”170  Based on this indefinite speculation, 
the court was not convinced that the plaintiffs would have a 
 
164 Id. at 1221 (quoting Tuazon, 433 F.3d at 1178). 
165 Id. “[A]n alternative forum ordinarily exists when the defendant is amenable 
to service of process in the foreign forum.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lueck 
v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1143 (9th Cir. 2001)).  
166 Id. “The foreign forum must provide the plaintiff with some remedy for his 
wrong in order for the alternative forum to be adequate.” Id. (quoting Lueck, 236 
F.3d at 1143). 
167 Id. at 1222. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 1222–23. 
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remedy in the foreign forum and denied the motion to dismiss on 
grounds of forum non conveniens.171 
Yet, shortly thereafter, in the 2016 case of Jiangsu Hongyuan 
Pharmaceutical Co. v. DI Global Logistics, Inc., the Chinese 
courts were found to be an adequate available forum for a lawsuit 
based on “contractual and noncontractual claims” due to the 
defendant’s failure to pay for “shipments of chemical products.”172  
The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida reviewed the availability of China and concluded that the 
defendant “agreed to submit to China’s jurisdiction.”173  In the 
court’s estimation, “[w]hether China is an available alternative 
forum is a simple inquiry in this instance, as ‘[a]n agreement by 
the defendant to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign forum 
typically satisfies the availability requirement.’ ”174  
In addition to determining the availability of the foreign 
forum, the district court also had to decide whether the foreign 
forum was adequate.  The court began its analysis by looking to 
Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., and stated that the defendant only has 
the burden of persuasion with respect to establishing adequacy 
when the plaintiff first “substantiates its allegations of corruption 
or delay.”175  The plaintiff, Hongyuan, provided scholarly articles 
as evidence of the inadequacy of the Chinese judicial system 
indicating “potential for excessive trial delays, obstructive legal 
counsel, corruption, lack of legal safeguards, [and] undue influ-
ence by political leadership.”176  The court, in reviewing decisions 
by other district courts, found that “[t]he great weight of author-
ity holds that ‘generalized, anecdotal complaints of corruption are 
not enough for a federal court to declare that [a nation’s] legal 
system is so corrupt that it can’t serve as an adequate forum.’ ”177  
Thus, the district court held that plaintiff’s generalized, anecdot-
al, and unsubstantiated evidence was too speculative to warrant 
a finding that China would not provide an adequate forum.178  
 
171 Id. at 1223. 
172 159 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1320–21 (S.D. Fla. 2016). 
173 Id. at 1332. 
174 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tang v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., No. DKC 
09-0088, 2010 WL 1375373, at *5 (D. Md. Mar. 29, 2010), aff’d, 656 F.3d 242 (4th 
Cir. 2011)).  
175 Id. at 1330 (citing Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 
2001)). 
176 Id. (alteration in original). 
177 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Stroitelstvo Bulg. Ltd. v. Bulg.-
Am. Enter. Fund, 589 F.3d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 2009)). 
178 Id. at 1331–32. 
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III.  ADEQUATE AVAILABLE FORUM—HOW COURTS  
ARE INFLUENCED IN THEIR DECISION-MAKING 
As is apparent from the previous Part, many determinants 
affect how a court will address the issue of whether an alterna-
tive forum is adequate.  To better understand and categorize the 
factors that impact the court’s decision-making on this issue, 
Michael Lii performed an empirical examination of adequate 
available forum decisions.179  After setting the time and search 
parameters to identify cases that analyzed adequate alternative 
forums, Lii identified 1,083 cases that involved a decision about 
forum non conveniens with an alternative forum in a foreign 
country, which was eventually whittled down to 692 cases.180  
Lii determined that between 1982 and 2006, 105 different 
countries were discussed as adequate alternative forums in 
forum non conveniens analyses.181  However, only eighteen per-
cent of the decisions were denials of the forum non conveniens 
motion “based on inadequate forum.”182  In other words, “a for-
eign forum was judged to be adequate 82% of the time 
[throughout] the period of 1982 through 2006.”183  Further, wheth-
er a case involved a tort claim or a contract dispute was 
statistically insignificant in determining whether a foreign forum 
was adequate, as courts found the forum adequate over eighty-
three percent of the time in such cases.184   
Cases were also analyzed using variables that were 
determined to possibly “influence a judge’s perception” of the 
adequacy or inadequacy of a foreign court, such as “measures of 
political rights, civil liberties, political stability, government ef-
fectiveness, rule of law, and corruption.”185  Lii posited that 
countries with more “political rights and civil liberties” may have 
a higher degree of adequacy determinations by the courts than 
those countries that are considered “more repressive.”186  
 
179 Michael T. Lii, An Empirical Examination of the Adequate Alternative Forum 
in the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 8 RICHMOND J. GLOB. L. & BUS. 513, 513 
(2009). 
180 Id. at 521–22. 
181 Id. at 525. 
182 Id. at 526 tbl.4. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 531 tbl.10 (showing that 250 contract cases were reviewed in which an 
adequate forum was found 83.6% of the time and 354 tort cases which included “per-
sonal injury, defamation, and tort” and in which an adequate forum was found 83.9% 
of the time). 
185 Id. at 522. 
186 Id. at 537. 
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Utilizing a study by Freedom House, an organization that mea-
sures political rights and civil liberties and classifies countries as 
“free, partly free, and not free,” Lii determined that courts found 
a foreign forum in a free country as adequate eighty-six percent 
of the time, while a foreign forum in a partly free country was 
found adequate seventy-eight percent of the time, and not free 
countries were found adequate only sixty-four percent of the 
time.187  Lii extrapolated from this data that “district courts are 
less apt to find an adequate forum in countries with fewer 
political rights and fewer civil liberties.”188 
A similar result occurs in examining a foreign country’s 
degree of political instability and government effectiveness, rule 
of law, and control of corruption.189  With respect to political 
instability, Lii classified countries in three tiers: the bottom third 
of the countries were classified unstable, the middle third were 
considered medium stable, and the top third of the countries 
were classified as stable.190  Of those countries classified unsta-
ble, district courts still found the forums an adequate alternative 
seventy-three percent of the time, despite the risk of government 
coups or civil war.191  Countries that were considered either med-
ium stable or stable were found to have judicial systems that 
provided adequate forums eighty-four percent of the time.192   
As with political stability, Lii ranked government effec-
tiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption.  According to Lii, 
“[e]ffective governments go hand-in-hand with confidence that 
the rule of law governs society and a lack of corruption within 
 
187 Id.  
188 Id. at 537–38. 
189 Political instability is defined as “a real risk that the government could be 
overthrown or a real risk of civil war [which] could leave the courts malfunctioning 
or unable to adjudicate disputes.” Id. at 539.  
Government effectiveness measures the quality of the civil servants in a 
country and the independence of the civil service from political pressures. 
Rule of law seeks to measure the confidence . . . individuals have that the 
rules of law in a country will be obeyed and enforced as well as the 
effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary. Control of corruption is a 
measure of how well a society controls the use of public power for private 
gain. 
Id. at 541 (footnotes omitted) (citing FAQ, WORLD BANK: WORLD GOVERNANCE 
INDICATORS, https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/FAQ [https://perma.cc/ 
4WP3-UXU3] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020)).  
190 Id. at 540 tbl.18. 
191 Id. at 539–40, 540 tbl.18. 
192 Id. at 540 tbl.18. 
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government institutions.”193  This grouping was then broken into 
three tiers, with each tier containing approximately one-third of 
the countries observed.  The bottom one-third contained those coun-
tries that were “the average of the least effective governments, 
the least respect for the rule of law countries, and the most 
corrupt countries.”194  With regard to this bottom tier, district 
courts found that despite the lack of effective government, 
respect for the rule of law, and corruption, the forum was still 
adequate sixty-seven percent of the time.195  In contrast, those 
countries in the top tier—with the most effective government, 
respect for the rule of law, and least corrupt—had adequate 
forums eighty-six percent of the time.196  Based on these results, 
Lii rightly concludes that when district courts are reviewing 
whether an alternative foreign forum is adequate, the court is 
influenced by factors outside the parameters of the Piper 
decision, including “the political, social, and economic conditions” 
of the foreign forum, potentially without being fully apprised or 
informed of the critical information needed to make such a 
determination that could affect foreign relations.197 
IV.  SEPARATION OF POWERS—WHO HAS THE 
AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN RELATIONS? 
A central tenet of our tripartite constitutional government is 
the division of powers among the three branches of federal 
government and the resulting checks and balances that result 
from this separation.  However, no unifying doctrine with respect 
to separation of powers has evolved over the two hundred years 
that the term has been used in the American constitutional 
framework.198  The concept of separation of powers and the con-
current, complementary balance of powers is based upon the 
Framers’ experiences surrounding the duties and problems of 
managing a government.  “The [F]ramers of the American Consti-
tution did not want a political system so fragmented in structure, 
so divided in authority, that government could not function.”199  
 
193 Id. at 541. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 542. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 552. 
198 GERHARD CASPER, SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD 8 
(1997). 
199 LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE 
PRESIDENT 7–8 (6th ed. 2014). 
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On May 30, 1787, the Framers adopted a resolution “that a na-
tional government ought to be established consisting of a supreme 
Legislative, Judiciary, and Executive,”200 which was basically the 
entire discussion regarding separation of powers by the Framers.  
Almost one hundred and fifty years later, Justice Story stated 
that the Framers adopted separation of powers but “endeavored 
to prove that a rigid adherence to it in all cases would be 
subversive of the efficiency of the government, and result in the 
destruction of the public liberties.”201  This position carried for-
ward to present day with the Supreme Court opining in Morrison 
v. Olson that the Court has “never held that the Constitution 
requires that the three branches of Government ‘operate with 
absolute independence.’ ”202  To best understand, then, the role of 
the Executive with respect to foreign relations, one must look to 
original understanding and meaning of executive power, histori-
cal practice by the Executive, and the explicit constitutional 
structure regarding the Executive’s role in foreign affairs. 
With respect to the area of foreign affairs, the Constitution 
provides “checks and balances” by distributing powers among the 
three branches of federal government, “with specified procedures 
setting forth how these powers can be exercised and how the 
various entities interact.”203  The Framers, while advocating poli-
cies and positions that supported separation of powers among the 
three branches of government, based on their experiences with 
the inefficiencies of the Continental Congress, also desired a 
separate and independent Executive.204  While no “foreign affairs” 
clause exists in the Constitution that explicitly and exclusively 
grants foreign affairs powers to the President, the conduct of 
foreign affairs and its accompanying powers often has rested 
with the Executive.  
In achieving the separation of powers such that the three 
branches act as checks and balances on each other, it is 
important to recognize that many of the powers exercised by the 
branches are implied rather than explicit.  As early as 1793, 
Alexander Hamilton, using “Pacificus” as a pseudonym, stated that 
 
200 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 29–31 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1966). 
201 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 396 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Little, Brown, & Co. 5th ed. 1891) (1833). 
202 487 U.S. 654, 693–94 (1988) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 
707 (1974)). 
203 RAMSEY, supra note 17, at 4.  
204 FISHER, supra note 199, at 9. 
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President Washington’s authority to issue the Neutrality Procla-
mation205 was derived from Article II of the Constitution that 
“[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America.”206  It was Hamilton’s view that outside 
of the Senate’s power to advise and consent in the appointment of 
officers, its role in making treaties, and Congress’s explicit 
authority to declare war, “all other executive powers were lodged 
solely in the President.”207  That being said, courts are not forbid-
den to address cases that touch upon foreign affairs, and will 
routinely decide cases that have foreign relations implications.  
Courts should not engage, however, in foreign affairs policymak-
ing that is normally reserved as the purview of the Executive.   
The notion that the Executive has inherent foreign affairs 
powers that are not explicitly reserved to the Executive or to 
Congress and that are therefore derived extra-constitutionally 
has been embraced by the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,208 Dames & Moore v. Regan,209 and 
reaffirmed recently in Zivotofsky v. Kerry.210  In Curtiss-Wright, 
Justice Sutherland wrote for the Court that the President was 
“the sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
international relations.”211  In 1934, President Roosevelt imposed 
an embargo prohibiting arms sales to both Bolivia and Para-
guay.212  Curtiss-Wright violated the embargo and was pros-
ecuted by the federal government.213  The company claimed that 
the embargo was unconstitutional on the grounds that Congress 
 
205 Id. at 15–16. The Neutrality Proclamation was a declaration by President 
Washington regarding America’s neutrality in the war between England and France. 
George Washington, Neutrality Proclamation, FOUNDERS ONLINE (Apr. 22, 1793), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-12-02-0371 [https://perma.cc/ 
T4KW-KL9Y]. Relying on the “law of nations” President Washington instructed all 
Americans to avoid involvement in the war or face prosecution. Id. 
206 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
207 FISHER, supra note 199, at 15–16 (citing 4 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 439 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904)). 
208 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936). 
209 453 U.S. 654, 685–86 (1981). 
210 576 U.S. 1, 13–14 (2015). 
211 299 U.S. at 320. Many commentators have questioned the reasoning of 
Curtiss-Wright, and subsequent Supreme Court decisions prior to Zivotofsky v. Kerry 
had not given it much weight. See, e.g., RAMSEY, supra note 17, at 14. However, 
lower court judges, scholars, and lawyers have continued to invoke the reasoning of 
Curtiss-Wright to argue that the President “has a special role in foreign affairs” that 
reaches beyond the text of the Constitution. Id.  
212 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 311–13. 
213 Id. at 311. 
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had delegated too much authority to the Executive.214  The Court 
ruled against Curtiss-Wright based on the President’s broad 
powers in the area of foreign affairs despite the Constitution’s 
silence on this particular subject.215  The Court reasoned that 
simply because the Constitution did not explicitly grant a 
particular foreign affairs power to the Executive did not mean 
that it did not exist.216  
Further, even though areas of overlap between Congress and 
the President regarding the exercise of foreign affairs exist in the 
Constitution, when Congress fails to act, the President may exer-
cise authority.  During the Korean War, as a result of a threat-
ened strike at major United States steel manufacturing mills 
that endangered the production of supplies needed for the war, 
President Harry Truman ordered that the government take 
control of the mills.217  Congress did not authorize this action; 
rather, the President asserted that he was acting under his own 
implied Constitutional authority.218  Justice Black, writing for the 
Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Sei-
zure Case), disagreed with President Truman’s stance and stated 
that presidential power had to come either through an act of 
Congress or directly from specific provisions of the Constitution.219 
Justice Jackson, while agreeing with the outcome of the 
Court, wrote in his concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case what 
has now become the familiar tripartite framework regarding the 
exercise of presidential power.220  First, “[w]hen the President 
acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, 
his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he 
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”221  
Second, “in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of 
authority” there exists a “zone of twilight in which he and 
Congress may have concurrent authority,” and where “congress-
ional inertia, indifference or quiescence may” allow the Executive 
to exercise his power.222  Finally, if “the President takes measures 
 
214 Id. at 314–15. 
215 Id. at 318–20, 322. 
216 Id. at 321–22. 
217 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 
579, 583 (1952). 
218 Id. at 583–84.  
219 Id. at 691. 
220 Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
221 Id. at 635.  
222 Id. at 637. 
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incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress . . . 
he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any 
costitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”223  
Justice Jackson indicated that because Congress had disap-
proved of the presidential action of the seizure of the steel mills, 
the President’s authority was at its “lowest ebb.”224  This condition 
effectively prevented the President’s actions unless his decision 
was grounded in Constitutional textual authority.225  Further, if 
Congress had not disapproved, then the President would take 
action in a “zone of twilight” where constitutional authority is not 
explicit, but rather, where implied authority to act is often 
found.226  Jackson’s formulation of presidential authority with 
regard to foreign affairs “assumed that the Constitution was 
incomplete on key foreign affairs matters, and that the gaps 
would be filled in other ways.”227  Thus, Jackson’s belief, as 
articulated in the Steel Seizure Case, was that the President’s 
authority to act in foreign affairs was created as a result of “the 
branches of government . . . implicitly[ ] working together.228   
Events in 1979 resulted in the Supreme Court again looking 
at the Executive’s power with regard to foreign affairs.  The 
precursor to the Supreme Court decision in Dames & Moore v. 
Regan was the conflict that resulted between the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and the United States of America that began 
with the taking of hostages at the United States Embassy.  On 
the morning of November 4, a group of Iranian students stormed 
and seized the American Embassy and, with the coordination and 
ultimate complicity of the Iranian government, restrained over 
50 United States embassy personnel against their will for 444 
days.229  The Iranian Hostage crisis resulted in President Carter 
taking a series of punitive actions against the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, including freezing Iranian assets in the United States.230  
 
223 Id.  
224 Id. at 637–38, 640.  
225 Id. at 637–38.  
226 Id. at 637. 
227 RAMSEY, supra note 17, at 53. 
228 Id. 
229 MARK BOWDEN, GUESTS OF THE AYATOLLAH: THE FIRST BATTLE IN AMERICA’S 
WAR WITH MILITANT ISLAM 2, 5, 639 (2006). 
230 President Carter acted pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act, and blocked the removal or transfer of “all property and interests in 
property of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities[,] 
and the Central Bank of Iran which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States.” Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1979). 
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At the same time, United States citizens brought thousands of 
claims against Iranian entities in United States courts for losses 
suffered when the Islamic Republic took over the country and 
ousted the then-leader, the Shah of Iran.231   
The United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
eventually began negotiations to resolve the issues that arose 
due to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s gross violations of inter-
national law.232  Two of the most important issues to be resolved 
during the negotiations for the release of the hostages were how 
to deal with the Iranian assets that were frozen in the United 
States and how to address the many thousands of claims that 
United States citizens had against Iran in an appropriate 
forum.233  
After several months of discussions, on January 18, 1981, 
the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran reached an 
agreement memorialized in two Declarations of the Government 
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, known as the 
Algiers Accords.234  The two Declarations—the General Decla-
ration and the Claims Settlement Declaration—addressed the 
 
231 On November 15, 1979, the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign 
Assets Control issued a regulation that provided that “[u]nless licensed or 
authorized . . . any attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or 
other judicial process is null and void with respect to any property in which on or 
since [November 14, 1979,] there existed an interest of Iran.” 31 C.F.R. § 535.203(e) 
(1980). On November 26, 1979, President Carter authorized “[c]ertain judicial 
proceedings” against Iran but did not allow the “entry of any judgment or of any 
decree or order of similar or analogous effect . . . .” 31 C.F.R. § 535.504(b)(1) (1979). 
232 Roberts B. Owen, The Final Negotiation and Release in Algiers, in AMERICAN 
HOSTAGES IN IRAN: THE CONDUCT OF A CRISIS 297, 298 (Paul H. Kreisberg ed., 1985). 
233 Id. at 301. 
234 CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES 
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 6–7, 7 n.16 (1998); GEORGE H. ALDRICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF 
THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DECISIONS OF 
THE TRIBUNAL 5 & n.3 (1996). Even though the two governments only “adhered to” 
the provisions of the Algiers Accords and neither the United States Senate nor the 
Iranian Majlis ratified the Accords, the document constitutes a “treaty” under 
international law. See United States v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. 189, 207 (1985) (Brower, Arb., concurring) (“This Tribunal has frequently 
resorted to the [Vienna] Convention in interpreting the Algiers Accords and the 
State Parties have declared the Convention to provide the applicable law of 
interpretation.”); see also Nasser Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. 157, 160 (1983) (“Since the Claims Settlement Declaration and the General 
Declaration together constitute a Treaty under international law, we are guided in 
interpreting them by Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties of May 23, 1969.”). 
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obligations of the two governments vis-à-vis one another.235  The 
General Declaration provided that Iran would release the 
hostages and that the United States would perform a series of 
actions and financial transactions, including releasing and 
returning the assets frozen by President Carter236 and nullifying 
judicial attachments against Iran obtained by litigants in United 
States courts.237 
The Claims Settlement Declaration of the Algiers Accords 
provided for the creation of the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal.238  This declaration provided that a Tribunal would be 
“established for the purpose of deciding claims of nationals of the 
United States against Iran and claims of nationals of Iran 
against the United States . . . [which arose] out of debts, con-
tracts, . . . expropriations or other measures affecting property 
rights.”239  Additionally, the Tribunal had jurisdiction over claims 
of the two governments against each other “arising out of 
contractual arrangements between them for the purchase of 
goods and services,” and over “dispute[s] as to the interpretation 
or performance of any provision” of the Algiers Accords.240  
However, claims by the hostages that resulted from their illegal 
captivity were specifically excluded from the Claims Settlement 
Declaration.241  This exclusionary decision was subsequently rati-
fied through Executive Order242 and has been upheld consistently 
 
235 General Declaration, Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of 
Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981 [hereinafter General Declaration], http://www.iusct.net/ 
General%20Documents/1-General%20Declaration%E2%80%8E.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
X5Q8-T2C6]; Claims Settlement Declaration, Declaration of the Government of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by 
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981 [hereinafter Claims Settlement Declaration], 
http://www.iusct.net/General%20Documents/2-Claims%20Settlement%20Declaration.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7CRB-UKWM]. 
236 The sanctions were revoked by Executive Orders issued contemporaneously 
with the Algiers Accords. See Exec. Order Nos. 12,276–12,285, 3 C.F.R. 104–15 (1981); 
Exec. Order No. 12,294, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1981).  
237 General Declaration, supra note 235. 
238 Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 235, art. II, ¶ 1. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. art. II, ¶¶ 2–3. 
241 Id. art. II, ¶ 1; General Declaration, supra note 235, ¶ 11. 
242 Prohibition Against Prosecution of Certain Claims, 31 C.F.R. § 535.216(a) 
(1981). The exclusion was necessary in order to successfully implement the Algiers 
Accords. Exec. Order No. 12,294, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1981). The focus of the Claims 
Settlement provisions were solely on property issues, specifically expropriation 
claims and contract losses. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 235, art. II. 
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by the judiciary, despite numerous cases filed by the former 
hostages.243   
Upon the approval of the Algiers Accords, President Ronald 
Reagan suspended all lawsuits in United States courts against 
Iran that were within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.244  When the 
United States construction company Dames & Moore, among oth-
ers, decided to challenge the constitutionality of this Executive 
Order, the Supreme Court of the United States, in expedited 
proceedings, upheld the President’s authority to suspend law-
suits in the United States in favor of the alternative forum of the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.245 
Dames & Moore had claims against the Government of Iran, 
the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and several Iranian 
banks, which it had filed in United States court.246  Dames & 
Moore claimed that the Atomic Energy Organization terminated 
the contract “for its own convenience,” and as a result, owed 
Dames & Moore over $3 million “plus interest for services 
performed under the contract prior to its termination.”247  With 
the signing of the Algiers Accords, Dames & Moore’s suit was 
 
243 See, e.g., Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 843 (D.C. Cir. 
1984); Ledgerwood v. State of Iran, 617 F. Supp. 311, 316 (D.D.C. 1985). The United 
States Government agreed to bar claims by the hostages because it concluded that, 
since the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act would likely preclude United 
States courts from hearing claims of that nature, such claims would lack merit. See 
The Iran Agreements: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rels., 97th Cong. 98 
(1981) (statement of Thomas W. Luce III, Outside General Counsel, Electronic Data 
Systems Corp.). However, to ensure that the hostages were not left empty-handed, 
Congress passed two statutes–the Hostage Relief Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-449, 94 
Stat. 1967 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5561) and the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and 
Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, § 803, 100 Stat. 853 (codified at 
5 U.S.C. §§ 5569–70). The hostages, despite the commitment of the United States in 
the Accords and the explicit waiver by the United States of their lawsuits, have filed 
claims against Iran for monetary damages. To date, all of these lawsuits have been 
unsuccessful. Most recently, the plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive 
damages in the amount of $33 billion. Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 
228, 230, 239 (D.C. Cir. 2003). However, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia held that, since Congress did not expressly indicate a clear 
intent to abrogate the Algiers Accords with amendments to the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, the court had to uphold the commitments that the United States 
made to the Islamic Republic of Iran in order to secure the freedom of the hostages 
in 1981. Id. at 237–38. See also Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 646 F.3d 56, 62 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding that, absent specific congressional intent, the 2008 
amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act did not abrogate the Algiers 
Accords). 
244 See Exec. Order No. 12,294, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 139. 
245 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 655–58, 690 (1981). 
246 Id. at 663–64. 
247 Id. 
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terminated in favor of filing for redress before the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal.248   
Subsequent to President Reagan’s Executive Order suspend-
ing all claims against Iran, Dames & Moore filed an action for 
“declaratory and injunctive relief” in order “to prevent enforce-
ment of the Executive Orders and Treasury regulations.”249  
Dames & Moore argued that the Executive exceeded its statutory 
and constitutional powers in implementing the Algiers Accords.250 
The Court started its analysis by recognizing that the 
question stemmed from the “consequences of different types of 
interaction between the two democratic branches in assessing 
presidential authority to act in any given case.”251  While the 
Supreme Court recognized that the President’s actions with 
regard to releasing and returning frozen Iranian assets had 
statutory support,252 the Court did not find any explicit statutory 
or constitutional authority for suspending or terminating 
litigation in United States courts in favor of binding arbitration 
before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.253  Yet, the Court 
upheld the President’s action by reviewing a combination of 
factors. 
First, the court determined that statutes upon which the 
President relied did not provide specific authorization, but rather, 
the statutes were “highly relevant in the looser sense of indi-
cating congressional acceptance of a broad scope for executive 
action in circumstances such as those presented in this case.”254  
Second, the Court looked specifically to the enactment of the 
International Claims Settlement Act of 1949.255  Along with a full 
discussion of this Act and its subsequent amendments, the Court 
cited ten other settlements since 1952 with foreign countries to 
 
248 On February 24, 1981, President Reagan “suspended” all “claims which may 
be presented to the . . . Tribunal.” Exec. Order No. 12,294, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 139. These 
claims “shall have no legal effect in any action now pending in any court of the 
United States.” Id. 
249 See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 666–67. 
250 Id. at 667. 
251 Id. at 668. 
252 Id. at 674 (Because the President’s action in nullifying the attachments and 
ordering the transfer of assets was taken pursuant to specific congressional author-
ization, it is “supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of 
judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any 
who might attack it.” (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 637 (1952))). 
253 Id. at 675. 
254 Id. at 677. 
255 Id. at 680. 
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which Congress had not objected that supported its “conclusion 
that Congress ha[d] implicitly approved the practice of claim 
settlement by executive agreement.”256  Finally, Congress had not 
disapproved of the President’s suspension of claims.  Although 
Congress held hearings on the Algiers Accords, “Congress ha[d] 
not enacted legislation, or even passed a resolution, indicating its 
displeasure with the Agreement.”257  As a result, the Court deter-
mined that Congress had not “resisted the exercise of Presidential 
authority.”258  
Executive power over foreign affairs was once again 
judicially tested in Zivotofsky v. Kerry.  In 2002, Menachem 
Binyamin Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem to United States 
citizens; shortly thereafter, his mother went to the United States 
embassy in Tel Aviv to request a passport for her infant son.259  
Zivotofsky’s mother indicated to embassy officials that she wished 
her son’s place of birth to be listed on the passport as “Jerusalem, 
Israel.”260  Embassy personnel explained that, according to United 
States Department of State policy, the passport would list only 
“Jerusalem” as Zivotofsky’s place of birth.261  Zivotofsky’s parents 
were dissatisfied with this response and sued in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking to 
enforce section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act 
in which Congress allowed citizens born in Jerusalem to list their 
place of birth as Israel.262  The district court dismissed the case 
on two grounds: first, finding that Zivotofsky lacked standing, 
and second, that the case presented a political question that the 
court could not resolve.263  Zivotofsky appealed and the D.C. 
Circuit reversed the district court on the standing issue, but 
affirmed that the issue was a political question.264  The Supreme 
 
256 Id. at 679–80. 
257 Id. at 687. 
258 Id. at 688. 
259 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 8 (2015). 
260 Id. 
261 Id. Congress enacted the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2003, in which Section 214(d) states that “[f]or purposes of the registration of birth, 
certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of a United States citizen born 
in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary [of State] shall, upon the request of the 
citizen or the citizen’s legal guardian, record the place of birth as Israel.” Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, § 214(d), 116 
Stat. 1350 (2002). Both the Bush and Obama Administrations refused to comply 
with this statutory provision. 
262 Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 8. 
263 Id. at 9. 
264 Id. 
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Court disagreed with the D.C. Circuit regarding the political 
question doctrine, and remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit for 
a decision on the merits.265  The D.C. Circuit determined that the 
statute was unconstitutional as it impeded the President’s ability 
to “recognize a foreign sovereign.”266 
 The case was appealed to the Supreme Court for a second 
time, with the Court this time affirming the D.C. Circuit.267  
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, began the Court’s 
analysis by moving from a strict constitutional textualism to an 
implicit recognition of presidential power, along with a functional 
consideration of the relationship between Congress and the Pres-
ident.  In Zivotofsky, the Court noted “the Nation must have a sin-
gle policy regarding which governments are legitimate in the 
eyes of the United States and which are not.”268  In support of 
this statement, the Court reasoned that the President is best sit-
uated to engage in “decisive, unequivocal action necessary to rec-
ognize other states at international law.”269  The Court justified 
this conclusion based on the Framers designating the President 
with “the traditional avenues of recognition—receiving ambassa-
dors, making treaties, and sending ambassadors.”270  As one com-
mentator noted, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion embraced the 
tenet that the “President’s exclusive power to recognize states and 
governments is a practical function of constitutional structure.” 271 
While Justice Kennedy blessed this executive authority with 
one hand, he did provide some limits with the other hand.  The 
majority emphasized that the language in Curtiss-Wright, that 
“[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external 
relations,” was dicta and that it does not govern the relationship 
between Congress and the President with respect to diplomatic 
relations.272  Specifically, while the “President does have a unique 
role in communicating with foreign governments . . . it is still the 
Legislative Branch, not the Executive Branch, that makes the 
 
265 Id. 
266 Id. (quoting Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 725 F.3d 197, 214 
(D.C. Cir. 2013)). 
267 Id. at 31–32. 
268 Id. at 14. 
269 Id. at 15.  
270 Id. 
271 Harlan Grant Cohen, Zivotofsky II’s Two Visions for Foreign Relations Law, 
109 AJIL UNBOUND 10, 11 (2015); see also Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 12. 
272  Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 20–21 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)). 
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law.”273  “The Executive is not free from the ordinary controls and 
checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue.”274  
But “[e]ven as [Justice Kennedy] buries Justice Sutherland’s 
famous functionalist pro-President dicta in Curtiss-Wright, 
Justice Kennedy revealed himself Sutherland’s true heir, 
embracing the logic and tropes that defined Sutherland-authored 
opinions in Curtiss-Wright and [United States v.] Belmont.”275  
Kennedy indicated that “the Nation must have a single policy 
regarding which governments are legitimate in the eyes of the 
United States.”276  Further, “the Nation must ‘speak . . . with one 
voice,’ ” with the President “engaging in . . . delicate and often 
secret diplomatic contacts.”277 
Equally important in understanding the Zivotofsky decision 
is historical gloss.  “Historical practice often plays a significant 
role in assessments of the Constitution’s distribution of authority 
among the three federal branches of government, especially in 
the area of foreign affairs.”278  While it is uncertain that the rec-
ognition power was historically reserved to the Executive because 
Congress accepted exclusive presidential authority or because 
Congress had simply not disagreed with the exercise of executive 
authority,279 the Zivotofsky Court noted that “it is appropriate to 
turn to accepted understandings and practice” and that “on 
balance [history] provides strong support for the conclusion that 
the recognition power is the President’s alone.”280  Thus, histori-
cal gloss is especially relevant to determinations of presidential 
power.  When authority is uncertain, “[t]he longstanding ‘practice 
of the government’ can inform [the Court’s] determination of 
‘what the law is’ ” in a separation-of-powers case.281 
 
273 Id. at 21. 
274 Id. 
275 Cohen, supra note 271, at 12 (footnotes omitted) (citing United States v. 
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937)).  
276 Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 14.  
277 Id. at 14–15 (first alteration in original). 
278 Curtis A. Bradley, Historical Gloss, the Recognition Power, and Judicial 
Review, 109 AJIL UNBOUND 2, 3 (2015) (citing Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. 
Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 
(2012)).  
279 Id. at 5. 
280 Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 23. 
281 NLRB v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014) (citation omitted) (first quoting 
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401 (1891); and then quoting Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
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V.  COURTS SHOULD DEFER TO THE EXECUTIVE IN 
DETERMINING AN ADEQUATE AVAILABLE FORUM 
UNDER SEPARATION OF POWERS 
“In no cases do the courts of this country defer to executive 
suggestions as often and as fully as in those having international 
ramifications.”282  As evident from recent Supreme Court decisions, 
the Court places great weight on the United States government 
speaking “with only one voice” when it involves the national 
interest.283  This role often fell to the United States Department 
of State as an obligation “to give the courts clear statements of 
the views of the political departments.”284  
For instance, the State Department historically was instru-
mental in setting forth the Executive’s position with respect to 
sovereign immunity, to which the courts would grant almost 
complete deference.  Foreign sovereign immunity is a well-estab-
lished principle of both United States and international law.  One 
of the first statements by the United States Supreme Court 
regarding this doctrine occurred in The Schooner Exchange v. 
McFaddon, where the Supreme Court relied on international law 
and territorial sovereignty to hold that a French vessel was 
immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts.285  This 
absolute theory of sovereign immunity granted foreign states 
immunity with respect to any activity, be it governmental or 
commercial, and courts routinely applied it throughout the 
nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries.   
Eventually, the United States Department of State began to 
take a more directed role in whether the doctrine of foreign 
sovereign immunity was applicable.  The Department of State, 
through a letter drafted by Jack Tate, the State Department 
Acting Legal Adviser, adopted the “restrictive theory” of foreign 
sovereign immunity, by which foreign countries retained sover-
eign immunity for public or governmental acts, but did not enjoy 
immunity with respect to private or commercial acts.286  Courts 
then began to defer to positions taken by the Department of State 
 
282 Michael H. Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions: Recog-
nition of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper?, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461, 461 (1963). 
283 Id. at 462. 
284 Id. at 498.  
285 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146–47 (1812). 
286 Letter of Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting At-
torney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic 
of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711–15 (1976), and in 26 Dep’t State Bull. 984–85 (1952). 
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regarding whether or not immunity should be granted to a for-
eign government.  The State Department developed a process by 
which it would make initial decisions about immunity.  If the State 
Department decided immunity was appropriate, it would submit 
a “suggestion of immunity” to the court.287  
The Executive was well within its constitutional prerogatives 
to provide suggestions of immunity to the courts regarding 
foreign sovereigns.  Courts would often defer to the executive 
branch as the branch of government best suited to provide 
guidance on foreign policy issues.  Additionally, Courts would 
routinely request and receive executive statements of interest 
supporting or denying application of sovereign immunity until 
Congress acted through passage of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, thereby removing the Executive’s discretion in 
this area and vesting the determination as to sovereign im-
munity and its exceptions in the courts.288  Through this legisla-
tion, Congress implemented the restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity and transferred from the Executive to the judiciary the 
responsibility for making the determination of sovereign immuni-
ty.289  Again, acting under its constitutional authority, Congress 
has acted to limit executive power in the area of foreign affairs 
and provide statutory guidance to the courts as to how sovereign 
immunity should attach to governmental actions.290  
Even though Congress has acted with respect to foreign 
sovereign immunity, with regard to determinations regarding the 
act of state doctrine, Congress has not intervened in a similar 
fashion.  Courts will still solicit statements of interest from the 
State Department and may defer to executive pronouncements 
regarding an act of state.  Likewise, Congress has not acted with 
any statutory decree with respect to forum non conveniens or 
determinations regarding the alternative available forum.  As 
Congress has not disapproved, the President may take action in a 
 
287 Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311 (2010). 
288 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2018). 
289 See William R. Dorsey, III, Reflections on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act After Twenty Years, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 257, 266 (1997). 
290 Despite this congressional mandate, the judiciary still gives greater deference 
to the Executive when the issue involves matters of international politics. See, e.g., 
Sea Hunt, Inc. v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 221 F.3d 634, 643 (4th Cir. 
2000) (finding that the Department of State was very influential in matters of inter-
national politics and its opinion should be given great weight); McDonald v. Socialist 
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 666 F. Supp. 2d 50, 51–52 (D.D.C. 2009) (giving 
weight to the United States’ statement of interest when international settlement of 
claims with Libya was challenged).  
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“zone of twilight” where constitutional authority is not explicit, 
but rather, where implied authority to act is found.  Absent any 
specific congressional intervention in this area of forum non 
conveniens decisions, the executive branch should opine on those 
cases that directly impact international comity or national policy, 
to which the courts should grant extreme deference. 
A number of reasons exist to support the conclusion that 
courts are not the institution that should make the decisions as to 
what qualifies as an alternative available forum.  Due to the burden 
of proof standard that the courts have devised for demonstrating 
the alternative available forum, the court’s decision often simply 
becomes a rubber stamp of the defendant’s argument that the 
available forum is adequate.  Once the defendant asserts that the 
forum is available and adequate, this minimal showing often 
shifts the burden to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the forum is 
either not available, not adequate, or both.  Some courts seem to 
apply a more rigorous standard for the plaintiff to prove that the 
forum is inadequate, especially once the defendant has made a 
prima facie showing that the forum is available and adequate.  
This higher barrier, whether implicit or explicit, which often 
cannot be met by the plaintiff, could be mitigated with 
statements of interest from the Executive when the issue 
regarding the adequacy of the forum involves international 
policy, such as corruption in the foreign government or political 
stability.  Some courts have given little weight to a plaintiff’s ev-
idence regarding the adequacy of the forum.  For instance, in 
Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., the court found that the 
evidence of plaintiff’s personal experience testimony regarding 
corruption and judicial bias and State Department reports 
regarding human right abuses offered by the plaintiff did not 
overcome the defendant’s arguments that the Philippines was an 
adequate available forum.291  If the executive branch opined more 
directly, however, courts could give greater weight to such 
statements when the question before the courts affects foreign 
policy or international comity.   
When the court deliberates on these questions, whether for 
reasons of judicial economy or based on the parties’ shifting burdens 
of proof, it flies in the face of executive prerogative with respect 
to foreign relations.  As posited by Professor Donald Childress in 
his article “Forum Conveniens: The Search for a Convenient 
 
291 433 F.3d 1163, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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Forum in Transnational Cases” with respect to comity and exec-
utive prerogative, “is there a risk that transnational litigation 
enmeshes [United States] courts in questions of foreign policy 
and threatens the sovereignty of foreign nations?”292  The simple 
answer is yes when separation of powers doctrine provides that 
the courts should defer to the Executive when making decisions 
that implicate foreign policy, especially when Congress has not 
spoken on the issue.  
So, when should the courts defer to the Executive under the 
separation of powers doctrine in determining the alternative 
available forum when Congress has not legislated?  Not every 
forum non conveniens case that involves a discussion of alter-
native available forum implicates foreign policy at a level that 
requires a separation of powers analysis.  When the alternative 
available forum is a procedural question or a previously litigated 
judicial question, the court is ideally situated to weigh and 
balance the parties’ evidence and ultimately opine on whether the 
foreign forum is available and adequate.  For instance, in 
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Thyssen Mining Construction of 
Canada, Ltd., the court found that Canada was not an adequate 
available forum because the statute of limitations had run under 
Canadian law.293  Procedural determinations regarding statutes of 
limitations or collateral estoppel and res judicata in foreign fo-
rums are within the ambit of the judiciary and do not impinge 
upon the executive prerogative that surrounds sensitive calcula-
tions regarding foreign policy.  Thus, courts should determine the 
adequacy of the available forum in these circumstances and not 
defer to the Executive, as foreign policy considerations are not 
implicated. 
However, when the issue that affects the determination of 
either adequacy or availability of a foreign forum implicates 
distinct foreign relations with the foreign country such that it 
involves civil liberties, corruption, measures of political rights, 
government effectiveness, or political instability in the foreign 
forum, the Executive is in the unique position to determine 
whether an adequate forum exists.  Congress has not legislated 
in this area so the Executive may engage in this “zone of 
twilight.”  Here, the federal government should have a single 
policy regarding which governments are legitimate in the eyes of 
 
292 Donald Earl Childress III, Forum Conveniens: The Search for a Convenient 
Forum in Transnational Cases, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 157, 158–59 (2012). 
293 703 F.3d 488, 496 (10th Cir. 2012). 
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the United States.  Courts are not properly disposed to decide these 
issues of foreign policy and may create potential problems when 
rendering decisions that may influence sensitive foreign policy 
objectives.  The court in Carijano, in determining whether Peru-
vian courts were corrupt, indicated as much by stating that its 
analysis hinged on averting “unnecessary indictments by our 
judges condemning the sufficiency of the courts and legal 
methods of other nations.”294  Thus, the Ninth Circuit ruled that 
Peru was an adequate available forum despite expert testimony 
that demonstrated that the Peruvian judiciary suffered from 
“ ‘institutionalized’ corruption, including widespread lobbying of 
judges, third party informal ‘intermediaries’ between magistrates 
and parties, and the exchange of improper favors and infor-
mation.”295  When assessing the adequacy of the forum resulting 
from allegations of judicial corruption, courts require a “powerful 
showing” with specific evidence, but are not requesting statements 
of interests from the Executive prior to making decisions that go 
to the core of foreign relations with a foreign government.296  As 
such, courts are “impermissibly interfer[ing] with the President’s 
[ability] to conduct the Nation’s foreign affairs.”297  This level of 
“interference” in foreign policy should never occur, as the consti-
tutional scheme does not allow it.   
So why is it important that the judicial branch defer to the 
executive branch in determining whether an adequate available 
forum exists in a forum non conveniens case between private 
litigants?  A serious foreign policy breach may develop if the courts 
do not provide deference to the Executive and instead overstep 
constitutional bounds and interfere with foreign policy.  Such in-
terference would render meaningless the determinations of the 
Executive in an arena oft reserved to it and would be done at the 
expense of a coequal branch of government—a branch of the 
government ill-suited for performing such a critical foreign policy 
analysis.  Courts are extremely reluctant to review a foreign forum 
judicial system’s independence, reliability, and ability, as is evident 
 
294 Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 643 F.3d 1216, 1226 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukr., 158 F. Supp. 
2d 377, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). 
295 Id. 
296 Id. (quoting Tuazon, 433 F.3d at 1179). 
297 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 725 F.3d 197, 202 (D.C. Cir. 
2013), aff’d sub nom. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015). 
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from the decisions in the Second and Eleventh Circuit.298  Relying 
on “considerations of comity,” courts avoid judging a foreign 
justice system so as not to offend a foreign nation.  This reluc-
tance to engage in policy conversations that touch upon foreign 
relations is exactly why the judiciary should defer to the 
Executive in these situations. 
When the determination regarding the forum centers on po-
litical considerations such as governmental corruption or political 
instability, the evidence that the courts need to examine in order 
to determine the adequacy of the forum from a foreign policy 
perspective is often not readily accessible to the parties or the 
court.  That information is in the province of the executive branch 
that is constitutionally placed to weigh in on such issues through 
statements of interest.  The court can then make fully informed 
decisions about the adequacy of a forum without relying on the 
adversarial nature of litigation to provide information that is 
critical to the decision and could ultimately affect foreign policy.   
CONCLUSION 
The arena of foreign relations policy is fraught with political 
landmines that are often best navigated by an Executive who 
“speaks with one voice” for the nation.  While most forum non 
conveniens decisions are not controversial with respect to the 
issue of an adequate available forum, the occasional case will dip 
into territory best left to those who are responsible for safeguarding 
international relations.  Courts are well positioned to determine 
the adequacy of foreign forums when the legal question regarding 
adequacy centers on procedural issues or easily decided questions 
of law.  However, when the issue regarding the adequacy of the 
forum centers on governmental corruption, political instability, 
political rights, or civil liberties, it is not in the court’s interest to 
make this determination, as it does not have the institutional ca-
pability to undertake the full analysis.  The conversation should 
be a multi-branch conversation, with the Executive providing a 
statement of interest to the court as to the advisability and 
feasibility of a fair and full hearing in the foreign forum.  This 
executive intervention may exist on a sliding scale—the more 
political and governmental legitimacy that the foreign forum 
 
298 Esfeld v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 289 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 2002); Leon v. 
Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 2001); PT United Can Co. v. 
Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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possesses, the more latitude the court may exercise in receiving 
information; the less political and governmental stability, the 
more likely the court is to defer to the Executive’s statement.  
Such deference will provide more confidence in the court’s final 
decision with respect to the alternative available forum.  In this 
regard, the Executive would be involved in a narrow slice of cases 
where it would act as the gatekeeper.  Such a function would act 
as a “negative trigger,” such that the courts would not make a 
determination that affects these aspects of foreign policy without 
input from the Executive.  This input rightly recognizes under 
separation of power doctrine the legitimacy and competency of 
the Executive to declare policy with respect to foreign forums.  
 
